by noting a few ways in which Nyāya anticipates the contemporary philosophical movement known as disjunctivism. I will start, however, by framing the discussion with an introduction to Nyāya epistemology.
The Theory of Knowledge Sources (Pramāṇas)
One of Nyāya's central contributions to Indian thought -arguably its primary c ontribution -is the articulation and development of an epistemological theory c entered on pramāṇas or knowledge sources. Nyāya conceives of pramāṇas as knowledge-producing mechanisms or processes. Representative are definitions by the early thinkers Uddyotakara (ca. 650 c.e.) -"pramāṇa is a cause of cognition" (upalabdhi-hetu pramāṇam) -and Jayanta (ca. 875 c.e.) -"pramāṇa is a cause of veridical cognition" (pramā-karaṇam pramāṇam) . Knowledge sources are specified by Nyāya as perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), analogy (upamāna), and testimony (śabda). 1 Pioneering scholars of Nyāya have framed its epistemology as a causal theory of knowledge in which a pramāṇa is a cause of knowledge par excellence, in the sense of proximate cause or trigger. 2 Indeed, various structural features of Nyāya recommend comparison with contemporary externalism or reliabilism, the view that a belief's positive epistemic status is a function of the reliability of its connection to the truth. More precisely, it resembles process reliabilism, the view that a belief partakes of positive epistemic status if it is produced by a reliable belief-forming process. Much of Nyāya's epistemological program is focused on the task of identifying and typifying such cognitive processes. Nyāya defends its typology of pramāṇas with great care.
Straightforward comparison between Nyāya's pramāṇa theory and reliabilism becomes quickly strained, however, by a curious feature of Nyāya's view, the notion that pramāṇas are inerrant. The following are representative statements by various Naiyāyikas (practitioners of Nyāya) of the early school. Gautama (ca. 200 c.e.) , the sūtra-kāra, defines perceptual cognition:
Perceptually produced cognition arises from the connection of sense faculty and sense object, does not depend on language, is inerrant, and is definite. (Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.4; my emphasis) 3 Vātsyāyana (ca. 450 c.e.), the earliest known commentator on the Nyāya-sūtra, says: "a pramāṇa has truth as its object" (NB 3.1.51; ND 771). 4 Uddyotakara says: "That which errs is not a pramāṇa" (NV 2.1.37; ND 515). 5 As noted above, Jayanta defines pramāṇa as a "cause of veridical cognition." He further argues that qualifications like inerrancy, given in the perception sūtra (NS 1.1.4), range over the definitions of all pramāṇa types:
Someone may propose that irregular causes of veridical cognition would be pramāṇas. So to exclude causes of memory, doubt, and wrong cognition, three words from the perception sūtra (Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.4), "caused by the object" (artha-utpannam), "inerrant" (avyabhicārī), and "determinate" (vyavasāyātmakam), should be carried over (to the defi-nitions of all the pramāṇas). For they apply in general to the set of four (perception, inference, analogy, and testimony). (Nyāya-mañjarī, ed. Varadacharya in Jayanta Bhaṭṭa 1969, p. 73) 6 Commenting on the term "object-possessing" (arthavat) in Vātsyāyana's opening phrase, "A pramāṇa is arthavat since successful action follows from pramāṇa-born cognition of an object," 7 Vācaspati (ca. 950 c.e.) explains:
The word arthavat employs the possessive affix (vat), which indicates necessary linkage (nitya-yoga). The condition of necessity (nityatā) means non-deviation. The import is that a pramāṇa does not deviate from its object. A pramāṇa's non-deviation amounts to the fact that there will never be a contradiction anywhere, anytime, in any other conditions, between the nature of the object and the predicate provided by the pramāṇa. (Tātparyaṭīkā 1.1.1; ND 3) 8 Some scholars of Nyāya have found the idea of inerrant pramāṇas troubling and philosophically indefensible. By their lights, to claim (for example) that our p erceptual faculty never fails or that testimony never leads us astray flies in the face of our most common experience. What are normally taken to be our most reliable knowledgeproducing faculties (e.g., perception, inference, testimony) are clearly not inerrant. It is suggested that Naiyāyikas, being good philosophers, would not hold such a bad view. 9 They would read Naiyāyikas as wholesale reliabilists, holding that pramāṇas are fallible, but on the whole reliable knowledge-producing mechanisms.
Nyāya's position is not, however, as strange as it may sound at first blush. As will be seen below, Nyāya privileges veridical, truth-entailing mental states and considers error conceptually parasitical upon knowledge. This entails a disjunctive account of pramāṇa and non-pramāṇa states. That Nyāya's knowledge sources are thought of as inerrant or factive is not a problem in such a view. Nyāya recognizes that there are error states that are subjectively indistinguishable from knowledge states. But this does not lead it to adopt a "highest-common-factor" view, where what is taken to be fundamental is an alethically neutral mental state. Rather, there are genuine pramāṇa-produced veridical states, and there are states not produced by pramāṇas, error states that imitate veridical cognition (in Sanskrit, pramāṇa-ābhāsa, a "semblance of pramāṇa"). This disjunctive conception will be reconsidered in the final section of this essay.
Arguments from Parasitism
Moving to our main discussion, what supports Nyāya's attitude of epistemic trust, which takes the form of a ground-level confidence that our cognitive faculties gain purchase on a mind-independent world? There are a few methods by which Nyāya supports a default trust in cognition. Most famously, perhaps, it argues that default doubt would stultify us, undermining our pursuit of various worthy goals in life. Given that the primary reason we reflect upon cognition is to become more effective in pursuit of our life's goals, an epistemology of default doubt, which undercuts our ability to function, would be pragmatically undesirable. 10 The argument from parasitism, which establishes the primacy of veridical cognition, makes no such appeal to pragmatic considerations, and is therefore among the more powerful theoretical planks in Nyāya's position. The upshot of this argument is that illusion and cognitive misfires of other sorts are parasitical on veridical experience. Error presupposes veridicality, and therefore, unless we conceive of our cognitive faculties as having some core connection to truth, we lose the very basis by which we may understand and reflect upon error states. Given this, it is right to start with an "innocent until l egitimate doubt" approach. What follows are a number of general illustrations of the argument.
In response to a Buddhist interlocutor, who contends that everything exists in a state of flux, and therefore that all cognitions of enduring things are false, U ddyotakara argues:
False cognitions are imitations of correct cognitions. Therefore, you must provide some example of correct cognition. (NV 2.1.16; ND 436) 11 False experience as of an enduring thing imitates or conforms (anusāra) to some true experience of an enduring thing. More specifically, the interlocutor must explain what kind of original, veridical experience could have generated the concept of an enduring thing, which we are said to then mis-ascribe to fluctuating streams. In a similar context, against an opponent who considers motion to be unreal, Uddyotakara argues:
All false cognitions imitate primary cognitions. You must state the original cognitions upon which the false ones are based. For we never find such a difference (between imitators and genuine things) without an original, as seen in the case of mistaken cognition of a post as a man. There being an existing post, one has the cognition "that is a post" regarding a person (in the distance). Or, there being a man, a post is mistaken for a man. (NV 2.1.33; ND 483) 12 Mistaking a post for a person in the distance is a standard example of perceptual i llusion in Indian discourse. Uddyotakara is arguing that such illusion, in which concept V is wrongly deployed in reference to an existing object d, requires that concept V be generated by prior experience of something V (or, it is implied, at least built out of sub-concepts that were appropriately experienced). This requires that at some point in the causal chain a veridical cognition be obtained by which the concept person was acquired.
In his commentary on Nyāya-sūtra 2.1.36, Vātsyāyana confronts a mereological nihilist, who argues that perceptual experience as of composite wholes is an error owing to ignorance of minute differences amongst micro-entities. The objector claims that as a forest is merely a collection of trees seen at a distance, or an army is a collection of soldiers, what are commonly taken to be composite wholes are nothing more than heaps of micro-entities. In his response, Vātsyāyana again appeals to the conceptual dependence of error upon the veridical:
[Vātsyāyana:] If there is an experience as of a single thing owing to non-perception of the differences between atoms -which are in truth separate and various, then such is a case of erroneous cognition, like the cognition of a post as a man. [Vātsyāyana:] The cognition of a man where there really is a man. Given the existence of that veridical cognition, one has the cognition "this is a man" regarding a post, because one apprehends the similarity between the post and a man. (NB 2.1.36; ND 503-4) 13 Vātsyāyana further argues that since his opponent holds that the experience as of a composite whole is always fallacious, there is no original veridical experience to which the error in question can be compared and found wanting. The opponent thus cannot provide an adequate account of the error that he cites.
In the arguments above, specific metaphysical theses are under consideration, and generally Nyāya defends commonsense realism against the attacks of idealists and anti-realists. The basic principle, however, is that falsehood presupposes true cognition. A theme that emerges is that in doubting the basis of the connection between cognition and reality, we lose the very distinction on which illusion or error makes sense. This is reiterated in the fourth book of the Nyāya-sūtra (4.2.31 ff.), in a more straightforwardly epistemological context. Here, we will begin to classify the specific forms that the argument from parasitism takes.
The sūtra's interlocutor, apparently a Mādhyamīka Buddhist, argues that appeal to pramāṇas does not settle the issue of the real (and independent) existence of things: 14 [Opponent:] The notion of knowledge sources (pramāṇas) and objects of knowledge is akin to that of dreams and their objects. [In his commentary Vātsyāyana elucidates the opponent's position:] As the objects within dreams are false but taken to be real, so, too, are the pramāṇas and their objects. 15 The Nyāya response (in sūtras 4.2.33-37) has many facets. Central to this study is the contention that dreams are understood as dreams only in distinction with waking consciousness and, therefore, that the Buddhist has illicitly helped himself to a case of accepted veridical experience in order to frame his thesis. Vātsyāyana:
It is only because the experience of something can establish its existence that nonexperience of it can establish its non-existence. And if in both states (waking and dreaming), the objects of experience did not exist, then non-experience would have no power to prove anything (NB 4.2.33; ND 1078). 16 We know that dream objects are false because upon waking we no longer perceive them. Our non-experience of them indicates that they lack a "staying power" that external objects are taken to possess. But non-experience's cognitive efficacy depends on that of experience. It is only because the latter is informative that we can trust that our non-experience of something (in the appropriate conditions) is evidence that it does not exist. I know that there is no elephant in my office because if there were an elephant, I would see it, thereby establishing its existence. A nalogously, if we did not take our enduring experience of objects in the waking state to be sufficient prima facie proof that they exist, the non-existence of dream objects would not suffice to indicate that they do not exist in the waking state. The cognitive distinction between dreams and waking awareness, upon which the objector's analogy rests, would be undermined by his very thesis.
A reconstruction of Vātsyāyana's argument:
1. The experience of external objects (by way of pramāṇas) is false and misleading, akin to the experience of dream objects (hypothesis for reductio). 2. Dream objects are known to be false only in contrast with real objects, experienced in waking life (as apprehended by pramāṇas). 3. If we do not experience real objects in waking life, we do not know dream objects to be false. 4. We do know dream objects to be false. 5. Therefore, we do (generally) experience real objects in waking life (by way of pramāṇas).
The conclusion contradicts premise 1, which, as the weakest of the premises, is rejected. The "parasitism" premise is premise 2, and it bears the most dialectical weight in the argument. This argument about dreaming and waking is easily analogized concerning similar questions of illusion and other kinds of error in relation to v eridical experience. This version of the parasitism argument is epistemic. Knowing error is parasitical upon knowing truth (at an appropriate level of generality). 17 Later, Vātsyāyana provides another kind of argument from parasitism:
The mis-cognition of something depends upon an original. Clearly, here the parasitism is causal. Illusions of the sort described require, as a causal condition, the deployment of concepts like person. The concept person, it is held, requires the prior experience of actual men and women. 19 As noted above, this is tied to Nyāya's empiricism. Nyāya's theory of error is a theory of misplacement (anyathā-khyāti). False cognition generally involves the mis-ascription of concepts generated in past experience to something that is presently the object of a cognitive state. In illusion and other kinds of error states, the wrong concept is deployed in reference to the object of current experience, leading the predication portion of cognition (the viśeṣaṇa) astray, so to speak. The cognition is bifurcated, with part of it targeting the object "in view," while another part targets an object properly qualified by the mis-ascribed concept. Thus, every token error presupposes some direct cognitive contact with reality, which engenders the concept currently misplaced. 20 Uddyotakara supports this position with a third kind of parasitism argument, a parasitism of meaning. An opposing interlocutor contends that "there are no external objects; only consciousness exists." Uddyotakara argues that given such a view, the opponent bears the burden of accounting for the content of the concepts or words deployed in states mistakenly thought to reveal an external world:
If you claim that "consciousness takes the form of words," then explain what is meant by form. When something is mistaken for something else owing to similarity, it is said to share its form. Given your position, however, words do not exist, and therefore the statement "awareness takes the form of words" is meaningless. (NV 4.2.34; ND 1082) 21 The immediate context of this passage is Uddyotakara's claim that in the absence of a mind-independent, shared world, his interlocutor would be unable to argue his case, since we only experience the content of another's thoughts by means of external intermediaries (presumably, things like our sense organs and the air, which c onveys the sound waves that encode speech, etc.). In response, he notes that his interlocutor may claim that consciousness simply takes the form of speech. That is, we may have awareness of words in an entirely idealist framework, much as we may have conscious states that resemble things like trees or rocks or physical bodies. U ddyotakara's claim is that for conscious states to "take the form" or resemble something else, there must indeed be some other thing which they appropriately resemble or target. If not, it makes no sense to speak of them as "taking the form" of anything.
Uddyotakara provides a concrete example. The opponent contends that merely owing to differences in karmic influence, people may have different experiences, as of a river, without need for an external object to "ground" their experience. Uddyotakara responds:
He must be asked how consciousness arises in that very form (the form of specific objects). If consciousness takes the form of blood, then you must explain what blood is. Similarly, the form of water and river must be explained. In the sentence "They see a river of pus," each word, when examined individually, is found to be meaningless, if there are no real external objects. (NV 4.2.34; ND 1085) 22 Concepts, if divorced entirely from engagement with external reality, lose their content. As I understand it, the import is that having an illusion or hallucination of blood requires that we be able to deploy the concept of blood. But if we have never had the appropriate kinds of interactions with blood and such, we would not have such concepts. Analogously, the word "blood" would be drained of meaning. 23 Again, this is a parasitism of meaning.
Allied Arguments
I would like to note briefly another kind of dependence discussed by Nyāya. Error states require real causal mechanisms that undergird cognitive processes. When we recognize various sorts of error states, we note that there are often identifiable causal systems that account for the existence and nature of the error. Vātsyāyana notes that mirages of water arise out of the causal relations between sun rays, the earth, and a viewer's perceptual organ. As such, he notes that at an appropriate level of g enerality, false cognition requires some real causes (NB 4.2.35; ND 1088). Therefore, whole-sale anti-realism is untenable. One must admit real, external causal mechanisms in order to account for error states.
An allied but separate line of argument holds that some kind of dependence on pramāṇas is required for rational reflection and communication. Therefore, even an ardent skeptic must begin from a position of epistemic trust. One such argument involves the requirements for engaging in rational debate or discussion. Should a skeptic attack the ability of pramāṇas to deliver the truth, a general retort (seen in, e.g., commentaries on NS 2.1.11) is that without recognition of knowledge-delivering pramāṇas of some kind, arguments gain no traction, since rational persuasion requires appeal to trusted sources of knowledge. Further, the institution of language, which a skeptic unreflectively and trustingly employs, presupposes the proper functioning of knowledge sources of various kinds. Gaṅgeśa notes that, among other things, participating in conversation or debate presupposes the reliability of one's own memory and of the general correlations that undergird inductive reasoning. The skeptic trusts the deliverances of memory in that the words she employs have been united with certain meanings in past experience. She further trusts inductive generalization, exemplified in the trust that utterances tied to certain meanings in the past will continue in present discourse. 24 Given all of the arguments above, Naiyāyikas did not attempt to stand outside the deliverances of pramāṇas in order to critique them. As adverted to repeatedly in the sūtras, such is not possible, as one would lose the very resources for rational reflection altogether. Rather, Nyāya articulates a theory of default trust in pramāṇas and critiques individual cognitions as the need arises. As attacks are marshaled against the pramāṇa system, the Naiyāyikas' dialectical position is that they need only rebut such challenges or indicate that somehow the challenger is subtly relying on pramāṇas, though without acknowledging it, and is thus guilty of self-referential i ncoherence. Default trust in cognition and a fundamental realism are thus woven together in a host of arguments that appeal to parasitism of various kinds.
In summary, we have identified three forms of the argument from parasitism, and three allied non-parasitical arguments:
1. Epistemic parasitism. Recognizing that error is parasitical upon on knowing truth. 2. Causal parasitism. Any concept V that an individual deploys in various sorts of error states ultimately depends upon her original veridical apprehension of some instance of V (or of sub-concepts, which are then combined in one's mind). 3. Parasitism of content or meaning. Divorced from connection with external reality, concepts would be drained of content, as would the words whose meanings are tied to the concepts they express.
Other arguments:
1. Argument from causal networks. False awareness requires a real causal network, which undergirds the cognitive mechanisms that give rise to cognition.
2. Argument from probative force. Rational persuasion requires appeal to pramāṇas of one kind or another. 3. Argument from language. The institution of language presupposes the proper functioning of memory and truth of various kinds of vyāptis (inductive generalizations).
Anticipating the Disjunctive Turn
I think there is much that is attractive in Nyāya's multifaceted argument in defense of epistemic trust. It provides a principled defense of realism and a principled response to skepticism that seeks not to work though the parameters set by the skeptic but rather to subvert them. Moreover, the "innocent until legitimate doubt" approach has many interesting applications to various fields of inquiry, including philosophies of science and religion. I would like to close this essay by calling attention to the fact that Nyāya's arguments from parasitism and its notion of the inerrancy of pramāṇas tie together in a neat way that anticipates an important development in contemporary philosophy, commonly called disjunctivism (specifically epistemological disjunctivism). 25 Here, we may recall the earlier discussion of pramāṇa inerrancy. While Nyāya admits that any given instance of non-veridical cognition may be mistaken for a veridical cognition, it resists the Cartesian move to prioritize alethically neutral "appearance states." In the Cartesian response, both veridical and non-veridical states share a deep common core -an alethically neutral core -and the only difference between them takes place "outside" cognition. Such neutral states would be captured in phrases like "I am having the experience as of a computer in front of me" where the "as of" locution evinces neutrality toward the veridicality of the experience. The Cartesian quest is to start from what is taken to be directly present to consciousness, identified as such appearance states, and then try to work "outward" toward knowledge of the world.
By its arguments from parasitism, Nyāya resists the move "upward" to a fundamental cognitive state that may be amenable to both veridical experience and error. In this vein, Naiyāyikas would ask how a state can be "as of" a computer if we have no confident awareness of what a computer is in the first place. Nyāya rather stresses that our basic relation to the world is one of veridical experience, and that error is best thought of as a separate kind of mental state that is sometimes indistinguishable from the real thing. Moreover (and what I take to be the deep insight of Vātsyāyana's appeal to dreams versus waking states), the very condition by which we develop the skill of indentifying cognitive error and making the Cartesian jump to a higher-order reflection upon belief is the awareness of a difference between veridical and erroneous cognition -an awareness that requires acknowledgment of veridical cognition from the start.
The arguments from parasitism are thus complemented by Nyāya's theory of pramāṇa-ābhāsa, fallacious cognitive states that misleadingly look like the real thing. In the work of early Naiyāyikas, we find a great concern with this ābhāsa. For example, after speaking of pramāṇa as that which produces "definitive ascertainment of an object" (artha-paricchedaka) Uddyotakara (NV 1.1.1; ND 7-8) notes the existence of a second thing, an impostor of a pramāṇa (pramāṇa-pratirūpa) . This impostor is called pramāṇa-ābhāsa, a pseudo-pramāṇa or semblance of a pramāṇa, and is differentiated from the genuine article in that pramāṇa is arthavat (factive) while the ābhāsa is anarthaka (errant). The latter is spoken of under the heading of pramāṇa only in a figurative sense (pramāṇam ity upacaryyate) . This distinction provides a vocabulary by which Nyāya may recognize the phenomenal indistinguishability b etween true and false cognitive presentations without collapsing them into a core identical mental state.
Contemporary epistemological disjunctivism joins Nyāya in affirming the primacy of the veridical. Non-veridical cognitive states are held to be of a different fundamental kind from veridical states (hence, the name "disjunctivism"). Epistemological disjunctivism is thus a rejection of the Cartesian picture, and an affirmation of the power of our basic cognitive faculties to directly grasp the world. John M cDowell's remarks are paradigmatic:
But suppose we say -not at all unnaturally -that an appearance that such-and-such is the case can be either a mere appearance or the fact that such-and-such is the case making itself perceptually manifest to someone. As before, the object of experience in the deceptive cases is a mere appearance. But we are not to accept that in the non-deceptive cases too the object of experience is a mere appearance, and hence something that falls short of the fact itself. (McDowell 2009 (McDowell [1982 That a number of arguments given by pioneering disjunctivists echo Nyāya's position 26 underscores the fact that an engagement with Nyāya (and other Indian philosophies more generally) is not merely an exercise in philosophical history. There are enduring insights in the Nyāya view that anticipate and speak to contemporary developments and that may be mined for further contributions. Moreover, that the Nyāya position exists at all is useful for contemporary disjunctivism, as it gives support to the contention that disjunctivism need not be seen as a mere reaction. It may be motivated independently, as seen in a tradition never set against a dominant Cartesianism, but ever ready to challenge its presuppositions. In the other direction, I think that the parallels with disjunctivism set an agenda for further Nyāya research. Its approach to knowledge seems to resemble aspects of the disjunctivist position, 27 and tracing its development along those lines would, I think, illumine the cohesion of its core epistemological commitments.
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2 -Mohanty's statement is representative: "It is a peculiar feature of the Indian epistemologies that this causal meaning of pramāṇa is also taken to imply a legitimizing sense so that a cognition is true in case it is brought about in the right sort of way" (Mohanty 2000, p. 16) . Also see, e.g., Matilal 1986 , Phillips 1995 , and the introduction to Phillips and Ramanuja Tatacharya 2004. opposed is that we are radically mistaken about our experience of apparently external objects of common experience. the content of cognitive mental states is largely constituted by the external o bjects/facts to which they intend. This argument also clearly anticipates the semantic externalism endorsed by Putnam (1981) , that the meanings of words are indeed grounded in real things with which one has entered into various causal relations.
24 -Phillips 1995, p. 162.
25 -There are various arenas for disjunctivist thought (particularly in philosophy of mind, epistemology, and theories of action). And, as to be expected, there are various formulations of the disjunctive position in each arena. I am focusing on epistemological disjunctivism here. In providing general characteristics of epistemological disjunctivism, I do not want to commit myself to an overly specific account. My understanding is, however, primarily influenced by McDowell's work, as cited below.
-Consider the following:
When we set [the subjective "space of concepts"] off so radically from the objective world, we lose our right to think of moves within the space we are picturing as content involving. So we stop being able to picture it as the space of concepts. (McDowell 2000 (McDowell [1995 : 418)
If we refuse to make sense of the idea of direct openness to the manifest world, we u ndermine the idea of being in the space of reasons at all, and hence the idea of being in a position to have things appear to one in a certain way. (McDowell 2000 (McDowell [1995 : 418)
In any case of perfect illusion or hallucination, we can explain its character by reference to the case of veridical perception, and we cannot give an explanation of what it is like except by implicit reference to the kind of veridical perception from which it is indistinguishable. (Martin 2009 (Martin [1997 27 -I am thinking particularly about the following features of Nyāya: (a) a direct realist account of perceptual states; (b) a notion that external object(s) and property(ies) are partly constitutive of the mental states that grasp themepitomized by Jayanta's notion that pramāṇa-born cognition must be arthautpannam, born of contact with its object; (c) a disjunctive account of cognition, involving the notion of pramāṇa-ābhāsa, "semblance of a pramāṇa"; (d) a defense of default trust in cognition, as evinced in the arguments above as well as other arguments; and (e) a defense of the power of perception to capture deep structural features of the external world, including substances and relationships between universals. I plan to develop this theme more fully in a future paper. 
